The Tail that Wags the Economy: Belief-Driven Business Cycles and Persistent Stagnation

Kozlowski, Veldkamp & Venkateswaran

Discusion by Franck Portier


"Secular Stagnation, Growth and Real Interest Rates" June 18, 2015, Firenze



Roadmap



Roadmap



Roadmap





## Small economy with integrated capital market

- Risk neutral international investors
- Hand-to-Mouth domestic consumer-workers
- Aggregate shocks to capital quality
- Modigliani-Miller holds



- Small economy with integrated capital market
- Risk neutral international investors
- Hand-to-Mouth domestic consumer-workers
- Aggregate shocks to capital quality
- Modigliani-Miller holds



- Small economy with integrated capital market
- Risk neutral international investors
- Hand-to-Mouth domestic consumer-workers
- Aggregate shocks to capital quality
- Modigliani-Miller holds



- Small economy with integrated capital market
- Risk neutral international investors
- Hand-to-Mouth domestic consumer-workers
- Aggregate shocks to capital quality
- Modigliani-Miller holds



- Small economy with integrated capital market
- Risk neutral international investors
- Hand-to-Mouth domestic consumer-workers
- Aggregate shocks to capital quality
- Modigliani-Miller holds



## ► The dynamics will be driven by

- imes The dynamics of shocks
- $\times$  The dynamics of learning/believes



## The dynamics will be driven by

- $\times$  The dynamics of shocks
- $\times$  The dynamics of learning/believes



- The dynamics will be driven by
  - $\times$   $\;$  The dynamics of shocks
  - $\times$   $\;$  The dynamics of learning/believes



## Risk-neutral

- Require a expected return r\*
- Supply as much capital K as demanded for a return r\*



- Risk-neutral
- Require a expected return  $r^*$
- ▶ Supply as much capital *K* as demanded for a return *r*\*



- Risk-neutral
- Require a expected return r\*
- Supply as much capital K as demanded for a return  $r^*$



$$U_t = \log C_t - \frac{B}{1+\gamma} L_t^{1+\gamma}$$

$$C_t = w_t L_t + E$$

- Note: Final consumption good is the numéraire
- E is period exogenous endowment of consumption good
- Labor supply:

$$L_t = \frac{1}{B} - \frac{E}{w_t}$$



$$U_t = \log C_t - \frac{B}{1+\gamma} L_t^{1+\gamma}$$

$$C_t = w_t L_t + E$$

- Note: Final consumption good is the numéraire
- E is period exogenous endowment of consumption good
- Labor supply:

$$L_t = \frac{1}{B} - \frac{E}{w_t}$$



$$U_t = \log C_t - \frac{B}{1+\gamma} L_t^{1+\gamma}$$

$$C_t = w_t L_t + E$$

- Note: Final consumption good is the numéraire
- E is period exogenous endowment of consumption good
- Labor supply:

$$L_t = \frac{1}{B} - \frac{E}{w_t}$$



$$U_t = \log C_t - \frac{B}{1+\gamma} L_t^{1+\gamma}$$

$$C_t = w_t L_t + E$$

- Note: Final consumption good is the numéraire
- ► *E* is period exogenous endowment of consumption good

$$L_t = \frac{1}{B} - \frac{E}{w_t}$$



$$U_t = \log C_t - \frac{B}{1+\gamma} L_t^{1+\gamma}$$

$$C_t = w_t L_t + E$$

- Note: Final consumption good is the numéraire
- ▶ *E* is period exogenous endowment of consumption good
- Labor supply:

$$L_t = \frac{1}{B} - \frac{E}{w_t}$$



- v<sub>t</sub> is an aggregate capital quality shock
- ► Timing of decisions within period *t*:
  - × Capital market opens and capital allocation is decided
  - $\times$   $v_t$  is realized
  - × Labor and final good markets open



- v<sub>t</sub> is an aggregate capital quality shock
- ▶ Timing of decisions within period *t*:
  - × Capital market opens and capital allocation is decided
  - $\times$   $v_t$  is realized
  - × Labor and final good markets open



- v<sub>t</sub> is an aggregate capital quality shock
- Timing of decisions within period *t*:
  - imes Capital market opens and capital allocation is decided
  - $\times$   $v_t$  is realized
  - imes Labor and final good markets open



- v<sub>t</sub> is an aggregate capital quality shock
- Timing of decisions within period *t*:
  - $\times$   $\,$  Capital market opens and capital allocation is decided
  - $\times$   $v_t$  is realized
  - imes Labor and final good markets open



- v<sub>t</sub> is an aggregate capital quality shock
- Timing of decisions within period *t*:
  - $\times$  Capital market opens and capital allocation is decided
  - $\times$  v<sub>t</sub> is realized
  - imes Labor and final good markets open



- v<sub>t</sub> is an aggregate capital quality shock
- Timing of decisions within period *t*:
  - $\times$   $\,$  Capital market opens and capital allocation is decided
  - $\times$  v<sub>t</sub> is realized
  - $\times$   $\;$  Labor and final good markets open



- $v_t = v$  for all t
- $Y = \min(vK^{\alpha}, L)$

Firms optimal capital demand is such that

$$v\alpha K^{\alpha-1} = r^*$$

Then, given the Leontief assumption, labor demand and production are

$$Y = L = vK^{\alpha} = vv^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^{\star}}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$

$$w = \frac{E}{\frac{1}{B} - vv^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^{\star}}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}$$



•  $v_t = v$  for all t•  $Y = \min(vK^{\alpha}, L)$ 

Firms optimal capital demand is such that

$$v\alpha K^{\alpha-1} = r^*$$

Then, given the Leontief assumption, labor demand and production are

$$Y = L = vK^{\alpha} = vv^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^{\star}}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$

$$w = \frac{E}{\frac{1}{B} - vv^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^*}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}$$



- $v_t = v$  for all t
- $Y = \min(vK^{\alpha}, L)$
- Firms optimal capital demand is such that

$$v\alpha K^{\alpha-1} = r^*$$

Then, given the Leontief assumption, labor demand and production are

$$Y = L = vK^{\alpha} = vv^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^{\star}}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$

$$w = \frac{E}{\frac{1}{B} - vv^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^{\star}}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}$$



- $v_t = v$  for all t
- $Y = \min(vK^{\alpha}, L)$
- Firms optimal capital demand is such that

$$v\alpha K^{\alpha-1} = r^{\star}$$

Then, given the Leontief assumption, labor demand and production are

$$Y = L = vK^{\alpha} = vv^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^{\star}}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$

$$w = \frac{E}{\frac{1}{B} - vv^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^{\star}}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}$$



- $v_t = v$  for all t
- $Y = \min(vK^{\alpha}, L)$
- Firms optimal capital demand is such that

$$v\alpha K^{\alpha-1} = r^{\star}$$

Then, given the Leontief assumption, labor demand and production are

$$Y = L = vK^{\alpha} = vv^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^{\star}}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$

$$w = \frac{E}{\frac{1}{B} - vv^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^{\star}}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}$$



$$Y = v v^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^{\star}}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$

- ▶ Y is increasing in v
- Y is decreasing in r\*
- r\* and v move L and w in the same direction
- ▶ *B* moves *w* but not *L*



$$Y = v v^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^{\star}}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$

- ▶ Y is increasing in v
- ▶ Y is decreasing in r\*
- r\* and v move L and w in the same direction
- ▶ *B* moves *w* but not *L*



$$Y = v v^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^{\star}}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$

- Y is increasing in v
- ► Y is decreasing in r\*
- r\* and v move L and w in the same direction
- ▶ *B* moves *w* but not *L*



$$Y = v v^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^{\star}}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$

- Y is increasing in v
- ► Y is decreasing in r\*
- $r^*$  and v move L and w in the same direction
- B moves w but not L



$$Y = v v^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^{\star}}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$

- Y is increasing in v
- ► Y is decreasing in r\*
- $r^*$  and v move L and w in the same direction
- B moves w but not L



## Assume v is i.i.d.

- v uniformly distributed on  $[\underline{v} \ \overline{v}]$
- denote  $E(v) = \frac{\overline{v} + \underline{v}}{2}$
- Now firms install capital according to E(v), and then demand labor according to installed K and realized v<sub>t</sub>
- Capital demand

$$E(v)\alpha K_t^{\alpha-1}=r^*$$

$$Y_t = v_t E(v)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^{\star}}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$



- Assume v is i.i.d.
- v uniformly distributed on  $[\underline{v} \ \overline{v}]$
- denote  $E(v) = \frac{\overline{v} + \underline{v}}{2}$
- Now firms install capital according to E(v), and then demand labor according to installed K and realized v<sub>t</sub>
- Capital demand

$$E(v)\alpha K_t^{\alpha-1}=r^*$$

$$Y_t = v_t E(v)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^{\star}}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$



- Assume v is i.i.d.
- v uniformly distributed on  $[\underline{v} \ \overline{v}]$

• denote 
$$E(v) = \frac{\overline{v} + \underline{v}}{2}$$

- Now firms install capital according to E(v), and then demand labor according to installed K and realized v<sub>t</sub>
- Capital demand

$$E(v)\alpha K_t^{\alpha-1}=r^*$$

$$Y_t = v_t E(v)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^{\star}}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$



- Assume v is i.i.d.
- v uniformly distributed on  $[\underline{v} \ \overline{v}]$
- denote  $E(v) = \frac{\overline{v} + \underline{v}}{2}$
- Now firms install capital according to E(v), and then demand labor according to installed K and realized v<sub>t</sub>
- Capital demand

$$E(v)\alpha K_t^{\alpha-1}=r^*$$

$$Y_t = v_t E(v)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^*}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$



- ► Assume v is *i.i.d.*
- v uniformly distributed on  $[\underline{v} \ \overline{v}]$
- denote  $E(v) = \frac{\overline{v} + \underline{v}}{2}$
- Now firms install capital according to E(v), and then demand labor according to installed K and realized v<sub>t</sub>
- Capital demand

$$E(v)\alpha K_t^{\alpha-1} = r^*$$

$$Y_t = v_t E(v)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^*}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$



- Assume v is i.i.d.
- v uniformly distributed on  $[\underline{v} \ \overline{v}]$
- denote  $E(v) = \frac{\overline{v} + \underline{v}}{2}$
- Now firms install capital according to E(v), and then demand labor according to installed K and realized v<sub>t</sub>
- Capital demand

$$E(v)\alpha K_t^{\alpha-1} = r^*$$

$$Y_t = v_t E(v)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^{\star}}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$



$$v_{t<0} = E(v)$$

$$v_{t=0} = E(v) - \delta$$

$$v_{t>0} = E(v)$$



$$v_{t<0} = E(v)$$

$$v_{t=0} = E(v) - \delta$$

$$v_{t>0} = E(v)$$




$$v_{t<0} = E(v)$$


$$v_{t=0} = E(v) - \delta$$

$$v_{t>0} = E(v)$$











## • Y inherits the properties of v

- ► Y is proportional to v
- The dynamics of the model comes fully from the shocks
- ▶ Boring...



- Y inherits the properties of v
- ▶ Y is proportional to v
- ▶ The dynamics of the model comes fully from the shocks
- ▶ Boring...



- Y inherits the properties of v
- Y is proportional to v
- ▶ The dynamics of the model comes fully from the shocks
- ▶ Boring...



- Y inherits the properties of v
- Y is proportional to v
- ▶ The dynamics of the model comes fully from the shocks
- ► Boring...



- As in KVV, I assume that agents must estimate the aggregate shock distribution
- Their common information set includes all aggregate and shocks observed up to time-t.
- At each point in time, they use the empirical distribution of v<sub>t</sub> up to that point to construct an estimate of v
- With uniform distribution, that problem is super simple (analytic)...
- ... but conveys the main intuition of the paper



- As in KVV, I assume that agents must estimate the aggregate shock distribution
- Their common information set includes all aggregate and shocks observed up to time-t.
- At each point in time, they use the empirical distribution of v<sub>t</sub> up to that point to construct an estimate of v
- With uniform distribution, that problem is super simple (analytic)...
- but conveys the main intuition of the paper



- As in KVV, I assume that agents must estimate the aggregate shock distribution
- Their common information set includes all aggregate and shocks observed up to time-t.
- At each point in time, they use the empirical distribution of v<sub>t</sub> up to that point to construct an estimate of v
- With uniform distribution, that problem is super simple (analytic)...
- but conveys the main intuition of the paper



- As in KVV, I assume that agents must estimate the aggregate shock distribution
- Their common information set includes all aggregate and shocks observed up to time-t.
- At each point in time, they use the empirical distribution of v<sub>t</sub> up to that point to construct an estimate of v
- With uniform distribution, that problem is super simple (analytic)...
- but conveys the main intuition of the paper



- As in KVV, I assume that agents must estimate the aggregate shock distribution
- Their common information set includes all aggregate and shocks observed up to time-t.
- At each point in time, they use the empirical distribution of v<sub>t</sub> up to that point to construct an estimate of v
- With uniform distribution, that problem is super simple (analytic)...
- ... but conveys the main intuition of the paper



- ► I assume that it is common knowledge that shocks are uniformly distributed on [<u>v</u> v] ...
- ► ... but <u>v</u> and <u>v</u> are not known, but agent can learn about them.
- Given an history up to t = 0, the estimates of  $\underline{v}$  and  $\overline{v}$  are

 $\underline{v}_0 = \min\{v_{t<0}\}$  $\overline{v}_0 = \max\{v_{t<0}\}$ 

and

$$E_0(v) = \frac{\max\{v_{t<0}\} + \min\{v_{t<0}\}}{2}$$

E<sub>0</sub>(v) is directly affected by a measure of *dispersion* of the shocks → tails matter.




- ► I assume that it is common knowledge that shocks are uniformly distributed on [<u>v</u> v] ...
- $\blacktriangleright$  ... but  $\underline{v}$  and  $\overline{v}$  are not known, but agent can learn about them.
- Given an history up to t = 0, the estimates of  $\underline{v}$  and  $\overline{v}$  are

 $\underline{v}_0 = \min\{v_{t<0}\}$  $\overline{v}_0 = \max\{v_{t<0}\}$ 

and

$$E_0(v) = \frac{\max\{v_{t<0}\} + \min\{v_{t<0}\}}{2}$$

E<sub>0</sub>(v) is directly affected by a measure of *dispersion* of the shocks → tails matter.



- ► I assume that it is common knowledge that shocks are uniformly distributed on [<u>v</u> v] ...
- $\blacktriangleright$  ... but  $\underline{v}$  and  $\overline{v}$  are not known, but agent can learn about them.
- Given an history up to t = 0, the estimates of  $\underline{v}$  and  $\overline{v}$  are

$$\underline{v}_0 = \min\{v_{t<0}\}$$
$$\overline{v}_0 = \max\{v_{t<0}\}$$

and

$$E_0(v) = \frac{\max\{v_{t<0}\} + \min\{v_{t<0}\}}{2}$$

•  $E_0(v)$  is directly affected by a measure of *dispersion* of the shocks  $\rightsquigarrow$  tails matter.




- ► I assume that it is common knowledge that shocks are uniformly distributed on [<u>v</u> v] ...
- $\blacktriangleright$  ... but  $\underline{v}$  and  $\overline{v}$  are not known, but agent can learn about them.
- Given an history up to t = 0, the estimates of  $\underline{v}$  and  $\overline{v}$  are

$$\underline{v}_0 = \min\{v_{t<0}\}$$
$$\overline{v}_0 = \max\{v_{t<0}\}$$

and

$$E_0(v) = \frac{\max\{v_{t<0}\} + \min\{v_{t<0}\}}{2}$$

E<sub>0</sub>(v) is directly affected by a measure of *dispersion* of the shocks → tails matter.



- ► I assume that it is common knowledge that shocks are uniformly distributed on [<u>v</u> v] ...
- $\blacktriangleright$  ... but  $\underline{v}$  and  $\overline{v}$  are not known, but agent can learn about them.
- Given an history up to t = 0, the estimates of  $\underline{v}$  and  $\overline{v}$  are


$$\underline{v}_0 = \min\{v_{t<0}\}$$
$$\overline{v}_0 = \max\{v_{t<0}\}$$

and


$$E_0(v) = \frac{\max\{v_{t<0}\} + \min\{v_{t<0}\}}{2}$$

► E<sub>0</sub>(v) is directly affected by a measure of *dispersion* of the shocks ~→ tails matter.


























The model dynamics is now given by

$$E_t(v) = \frac{\max\{v_{\tau < t}\} + \min\{v_{\tau < t}\}}{2}$$
$$Y_t = v_t E_t(v)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^*}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$

Depending on the size of the current shock with respect to past ones, shocks will have temporary or permanent effect.




The model dynamics is now given by


$$E_t(v) = \frac{\max\{v_{\tau < t}\} + \min\{v_{\tau < t}\}}{2}$$
$$Y_t = v_t E_t(v)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{r^*}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$

Depending on the size of the current shock with respect to past ones, shocks will have temporary or permanent effect.





























































$$Y_t = \min\left(\frac{u_{it}}{v_t}K_t^{\alpha}, L_t\right) - F$$

- Firms that draw a too low u<sub>it</sub> are not profitable ex post
- They give back their capital (the collateral of their loan) before producing
- ► At the steady state, there is always a fraction of firms that default and close.
- ► That fraction will be permanently larger after a big shock
- Shocks are also amplified on impact by an extensive margin adjustment : not only firms produce less and revise downward E(v), but more capital is ex post idle.




$$Y_t = \min\left(\frac{u_{it}}{v_t} K_t^{\alpha}, L_t\right) - F$$

- ▶ Firms that draw a too low *u*<sub>it</sub> are not profitable ex post
- They give back their capital (the collateral of their loan) before producing
- ▶ At the steady state, there is always a fraction of firms that default and close.
- ► That fraction will be permanently larger after a big shock
- Shocks are also amplified on impact by an extensive margin adjustment : not only firms produce less and revise downward E(v), but more capital is ex post idle.




$$Y_t = \min\left(\frac{u_{it}}{v_t} K_t^{\alpha}, L_t\right) - F$$

- ▶ Firms that draw a too low *u*<sub>it</sub> are not profitable ex post
- They give back their capital (the collateral of their loan) before producing
- At the steady state, there is always a fraction of firms that default and close.
- ► That fraction will be permanently larger after a big shock
- Shocks are also amplified on impact by an extensive margin adjustment : not only firms produce less and revise downward E(v), but more capital is ex post idle.




$$Y_t = \min\left(\frac{u_{it}}{v_t} K_t^{\alpha}, L_t\right) - F$$

- ▶ Firms that draw a too low *u*<sub>it</sub> are not profitable ex post
- They give back their capital (the collateral of their loan) before producing
- At the steady state, there is always a fraction of firms that default and close.
- ► That fraction will be permanently larger after a big shock
- Shocks are also amplified on impact by an extensive margin adjustment : not only firms produce less and revise downward E(v), but more capital is ex post idle.



$$Y_t = \min\left(\frac{u_{it}}{v_t}K_t^{\alpha}, L_t\right) - F$$

- ▶ Firms that draw a too low *u*<sub>it</sub> are not profitable ex post
- They give back their capital (the collateral of their loan) before producing
- At the steady state, there is always a fraction of firms that default and close.
- ► That fraction will be permanently larger after a big shock
- Shocks are also amplified on impact by an extensive margin adjustment : not only firms produce less and revise downward E(v), but more capital is ex post idle.




$$Y_t = \min\left(\frac{u_{it}}{v_t}K_t^{\alpha}, L_t\right) - F$$

- ▶ Firms that draw a too low *u*<sub>it</sub> are not profitable ex post
- They give back their capital (the collateral of their loan) before producing
- At the steady state, there is always a fraction of firms that default and close.
- ► That fraction will be permanently larger after a big shock
- Shocks are also amplified on impact by an extensive margin adjustment : not only firms produce less and revise downward E(v), but more capital is ex post idle.

Roadmap





## A fully G.E. model with intertemporal decisions

- Finance introduced, gives nice amplification ...
- ... but is not at the core of the mechanism
- ► Nice way to discipline the exercice by measuring the φ (v in my mickey mouse model)) shock
- The story is not one of the effect of a disaster that we have never observed, but that of an observed disaster.



- A fully G.E. model with intertemporal decisions
- ► Finance introduced, gives nice amplification ...
- ... but is not at the core of the mechanism
- ► Nice way to discipline the exercice by measuring the φ (v in my mickey mouse model)) shock
- The story is not one of the effect of a disaster that we have never observed, but that of an observed disaster.



- A fully G.E. model with intertemporal decisions
- ► Finance introduced, gives nice amplification ...
- ... but is not at the core of the mechanism
- ► Nice way to discipline the exercice by measuring the φ (v in my mickey mouse model)) shock
- The story is not one of the effect of a disaster that we have never observed, but that of an observed disaster.



- A fully G.E. model with intertemporal decisions
- ► Finance introduced, gives nice amplification ...
- ... but is not at the core of the mechanism
- ► Nice way to discipline the exercice by measuring the φ (v in my mickey mouse model)) shock
- ▶ The story is not one of the effect of a disaster that we have never observed, but that of an observed disaster.



- A fully G.E. model with intertemporal decisions
- ► Finance introduced, gives nice amplification ...
- ... but is not at the core of the mechanism
- ► Nice way to discipline the exercice by measuring the φ (v in my mickey mouse model)) shock
- The story is not one of the effect of a disaster that we have never observed, but that of an observed disaster.





- Clearly something happened in 2008 and 2009
- Is  $\phi$  the primitive shock?
- Where do we read about a 15% drop of the capital quality?
- What could it be?





- Clearly something happened in 2008 and 2009
- Is \u03c6 the primitive shock?
- Where do we read about a 15% drop of the capital quality?
- What could it be?





- Clearly something happened in 2008 and 2009
- Is \u03c6 the primitive shock?
- ▶ Where do we read about a 15% drop of the capital quality?
- What could it be?





- Clearly something happened in 2008 and 2009
- Is \u03c6 the primitive shock?
- ▶ Where do we read about a 15% drop of the capital quality?
- What could it be?



- $\blacktriangleright$  Do I understand well that a drop in the observed q will be measured as a drop in  $\phi$  ?
- Perception revisions of the the type: "I realize that my investment will not be as profitable as I thought" can be seen as an explanation for recessions
- "News Driven Business Cycles: Insights and Challenges", Beaudry and Portier, Journal of Economic Literature (2015).
- $\blacktriangleright$  Do such expectation-driven booms and busts create variations in measured  $\phi$  ?



- ▶ Do I understand well that a drop in the observed q will be measured as a drop in  $\phi$  ?
- Perception revisions of the the type: "I realize that my investment will not be as profitable as I thought" can be seen as an explanation for recessions
- "News Driven Business Cycles: Insights and Challenges", Beaudry and Portier, Journal of Economic Literature (2015).
- $\blacktriangleright$  Do such expectation-driven booms and busts create variations in measured  $\phi$  ?



- ▶ Do I understand well that a drop in the observed q will be measured as a drop in  $\phi$  ?
- Perception revisions of the the type: "I realize that my investment will not be as profitable as I thought" can be seen as an explanation for recessions
- "News Driven Business Cycles: Insights and Challenges", Beaudry and Portier, Journal of Economic Literature (2015).
- $\blacktriangleright$  Do such expectation-driven booms and busts create variations in measured  $\phi$  ?



- ▶ Do I understand well that a drop in the observed q will be measured as a drop in  $\phi$  ?
- Perception revisions of the the type: "I realize that my investment will not be as profitable as I thought" can be seen as an explanation for recessions
- "News Driven Business Cycles: Insights and Challenges", Beaudry and Portier, Journal of Economic Literature (2015).
- $\blacktriangleright$  Do such expectation-driven booms and busts create variations in measured  $\phi$  ?



What do we observe?

## What is an observation?

- $\times$  a quarter? 220 observations since 1960
- $\times$  a cycle? 7 observations
- In the former case, the mechanism highlighted in the paper is very relevant: we may still have a lot to learn, and therefore a lot of mistakes and revisions to make



what do we observe?

## What is an observation?

## $\times~$ a quarter? 220 observations since 1960

- $\times$  a cycle? 7 observations
- In the former case, the mechanism highlighted in the paper is very relevant: we may still have a lot to learn, and therefore a lot of mistakes and revisions to make



What do we observe?

- What is an observation?
  - $\times~$  a quarter? 220 observations since 1960
  - $\times$  a cycle? 7 observations
- In the former case, the mechanism highlighted in the paper is very relevant: we may still have a lot to learn, and therefore a lot of mistakes and revisions to make



What do we observe?

- What is an observation?
  - $\times$  a quarter? 220 observations since 1960
  - $\times$  a cycle? 7 observations
- In the former case, the mechanism highlighted in the paper is very relevant: we may still have a lot to learn, and therefore a lot of mistakes and revisions to make

